Files
jupyterhub/jupyterhub/apihandlers/auth.py
Min RK 29b73563dc cache common scope operations
we expand/parse the same scopes _a lot_.
We can save time with some caching.

Main change: cached functions must return immutable frozenset instead of mutable set,
to avoid mutating the result of subsequent returns.

Some functions can only be cached _sometimes_ (e.g. group lookups in db cannot be cached),
for which we have a DoNotCache(result) exception
2022-04-01 11:35:05 +02:00

439 lines
17 KiB
Python

"""Authorization handlers"""
# Copyright (c) Jupyter Development Team.
# Distributed under the terms of the Modified BSD License.
import json
from datetime import datetime
from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, quote, urlencode, urlparse, urlunparse
from oauthlib import oauth2
from tornado import web
from .. import orm, roles, scopes
from ..utils import get_browser_protocol, token_authenticated
from .base import APIHandler, BaseHandler
class TokenAPIHandler(APIHandler):
@token_authenticated
def get(self, token):
# FIXME: deprecate this API for oauth token resolution, in favor of using /api/user
# TODO: require specific scope for this deprecated API, applied to service tokens only?
self.log.warning(
"/authorizations/token/:token endpoint is deprecated in JupyterHub 2.0. Use /api/user"
)
orm_token = orm.APIToken.find(self.db, token)
if orm_token is None:
raise web.HTTPError(404)
owner = orm_token.user or orm_token.service
if owner:
# having a token means we should be able to read the owner's model
# (this is the only thing this handler is for)
self.expanded_scopes |= scopes.identify_scopes(owner)
self.parsed_scopes = scopes.parse_scopes(self.expanded_scopes)
# record activity whenever we see a token
now = orm_token.last_activity = datetime.utcnow()
if orm_token.user:
orm_token.user.last_activity = now
model = self.user_model(self.users[orm_token.user])
elif orm_token.service:
model = self.service_model(orm_token.service)
else:
self.log.warning("%s has no user or service. Deleting..." % orm_token)
self.db.delete(orm_token)
self.db.commit()
raise web.HTTPError(404)
self.db.commit()
self.write(json.dumps(model))
async def post(self):
raise web.HTTPError(
404,
"Deprecated endpoint /hub/api/authorizations/token is removed in JupyterHub 2.0."
" Use /hub/api/users/:user/tokens instead.",
)
class CookieAPIHandler(APIHandler):
@token_authenticated
def get(self, cookie_name, cookie_value=None):
self.log.warning(
"/authorizations/cookie endpoint is deprecated in JupyterHub 2.0. Use /api/user with OAuth tokens."
)
cookie_name = quote(cookie_name, safe='')
if cookie_value is None:
self.log.warning(
"Cookie values in request body is deprecated, use `/cookie_name/cookie_value`"
)
cookie_value = self.request.body
else:
cookie_value = cookie_value.encode('utf8')
user = self._user_for_cookie(cookie_name, cookie_value)
if user is None:
raise web.HTTPError(404)
self.write(json.dumps(self.user_model(user)))
class OAuthHandler:
def extract_oauth_params(self):
"""extract oauthlib params from a request
Returns:
(uri, http_method, body, headers)
"""
return (
self.request.uri,
self.request.method,
self.request.body,
self.request.headers,
)
def make_absolute_redirect_uri(self, uri):
"""Make absolute redirect URIs
internal redirect uris, e.g. `/user/foo/oauth_handler`
are allowed in jupyterhub, but oauthlib prohibits them.
Add `$HOST` header to redirect_uri to make them acceptable.
Currently unused in favor of monkeypatching
oauthlib.is_absolute_uri to skip the check
"""
redirect_uri = self.get_argument('redirect_uri')
if not redirect_uri or not redirect_uri.startswith('/'):
return uri
# make absolute local redirects full URLs
# to satisfy oauthlib's absolute URI requirement
redirect_uri = (
get_browser_protocol(self.request)
+ "://"
+ self.request.host
+ redirect_uri
)
parsed_url = urlparse(uri)
query_list = parse_qsl(parsed_url.query, keep_blank_values=True)
for idx, item in enumerate(query_list):
if item[0] == 'redirect_uri':
query_list[idx] = ('redirect_uri', redirect_uri)
break
return urlunparse(urlparse(uri)._replace(query=urlencode(query_list)))
def add_credentials(self, credentials=None):
"""Add oauth credentials
Adds user, session_id, client to oauth credentials
"""
if credentials is None:
credentials = {}
else:
credentials = credentials.copy()
session_id = self.get_session_cookie()
if session_id is None:
session_id = self.set_session_cookie()
user = self.current_user
# Extra credentials we need in the validator
credentials.update({'user': user, 'handler': self, 'session_id': session_id})
return credentials
def send_oauth_response(self, headers, body, status):
"""Send oauth response from provider return values
Provider methods return headers, body, and status
to be set on the response.
This method applies these values to the Handler
and sends the response.
"""
self.set_status(status)
for key, value in headers.items():
self.set_header(key, value)
if body:
self.write(body)
class OAuthAuthorizeHandler(OAuthHandler, BaseHandler):
"""Implement OAuth authorization endpoint(s)"""
def _complete_login(self, uri, headers, scopes, credentials):
try:
headers, body, status = self.oauth_provider.create_authorization_response(
uri, 'POST', '', headers, scopes, credentials
)
except oauth2.FatalClientError as e:
# TODO: human error page
raise
self.send_oauth_response(headers, body, status)
def needs_oauth_confirm(self, user, oauth_client, requested_scopes):
"""Return whether the given oauth client needs to prompt for access for the given user
Checks list for oauth clients that don't need confirmation
Sources:
- the user's own servers
- Clients which already have authorization for the same roles
- Explicit oauth_no_confirm_list configuration (e.g. admin-operated services)
.. versionadded: 1.1
"""
# get the oauth client ids for the user's own server(s)
own_oauth_client_ids = {
spawner.oauth_client_id for spawner in user.spawners.values()
}
if (
# it's the user's own server
oauth_client.identifier in own_oauth_client_ids
# or it's in the global no-confirm list
or oauth_client.identifier
in self.settings.get('oauth_no_confirm_list', set())
):
return False
# Check existing authorization
existing_tokens = self.db.query(orm.APIToken).filter_by(
user_id=user.id,
client_id=oauth_client.identifier,
)
authorized_scopes = set()
for token in existing_tokens:
authorized_scopes.update(token.scopes)
if authorized_scopes:
if set(requested_scopes).issubset(authorized_scopes):
self.log.debug(
f"User {user.name} has already authorized {oauth_client.identifier} for scopes {requested_scopes}"
)
return False
else:
self.log.debug(
f"User {user.name} has authorized {oauth_client.identifier}"
f" for scopes {authorized_scopes}, confirming additional scopes {requested_scopes}"
)
# default: require confirmation
return True
def get_login_url(self):
"""
Support automatically logging in when JupyterHub is used as auth provider
"""
if self.authenticator.auto_login_oauth2_authorize:
return self.authenticator.login_url(self.hub.base_url)
return super().get_login_url()
@web.authenticated
async def get(self):
"""GET /oauth/authorization
Render oauth confirmation page:
"Server at ... would like permission to ...".
Users accessing their own server or a blessed service
will skip confirmation.
"""
uri, http_method, body, headers = self.extract_oauth_params()
try:
(
requested_scopes,
credentials,
) = self.oauth_provider.validate_authorization_request(
uri, http_method, body, headers
)
credentials = self.add_credentials(credentials)
client = self.oauth_provider.fetch_by_client_id(credentials['client_id'])
allowed = False
# check for access to target resource
if client.spawner:
scope_filter = self.get_scope_filter("access:servers")
allowed = scope_filter(client.spawner, kind='server')
elif client.service:
scope_filter = self.get_scope_filter("access:services")
allowed = scope_filter(client.service, kind='service')
else:
# client is not associated with a service or spawner.
# This shouldn't happen, but it might if this is a stale or forged request
# from a service or spawner that's since been deleted
self.log.error(
f"OAuth client {client} has no service or spawner, cannot resolve scopes."
)
raise web.HTTPError(500, "OAuth configuration error")
if not allowed:
self.log.error(
f"User {self.current_user} not allowed to access {client.description}"
)
raise web.HTTPError(
403, f"You do not have permission to access {client.description}"
)
# subset 'raw scopes' to those held by authenticating user
requested_scopes = set(requested_scopes)
user = self.current_user
# raw, _not_ expanded scopes
user_scopes = roles.roles_to_scopes(roles.get_roles_for(user.orm_user))
# these are some scopes the user may not have
# in 'raw' form, but definitely have at this point
# make sure they are here, because we are computing the
# 'raw' scope intersection,
# rather than the expanded_scope intersection
required_scopes = {*scopes.identify_scopes(), *scopes.access_scopes(client)}
user_scopes |= {"inherit", *required_scopes}
allowed_scopes = requested_scopes.intersection(user_scopes)
excluded_scopes = requested_scopes.difference(user_scopes)
# TODO: compute lower-level intersection of remaining _expanded_ scopes
# (e.g. user has admin:users, requesting read:users!group=x)
if excluded_scopes:
self.log.warning(
f"Service {client.description} requested scopes {','.join(requested_scopes)}"
f" for user {self.current_user.name},"
f" granting only {','.join(allowed_scopes) or '[]'}."
)
if not self.needs_oauth_confirm(self.current_user, client, allowed_scopes):
self.log.debug(
"Skipping oauth confirmation for %s accessing %s",
self.current_user,
client.description,
)
# this is the pre-1.0 behavior for all oauth
self._complete_login(uri, headers, allowed_scopes, credentials)
return
# discard 'required' scopes from description
# no need to describe the ability to access itself
scopes_to_describe = allowed_scopes.difference(required_scopes)
if not scopes_to_describe:
# TODO: describe all scopes?
# Not right now, because the no-scope default 'identify' text
# is clearer than what we produce for those scopes individually
scope_descriptions = [
{
"scope": None,
"description": scopes.scope_definitions['(no_scope)'][
'description'
],
"filter": "",
}
]
elif 'inherit' in scopes_to_describe:
allowed_scopes = scopes_to_describe = ['inherit']
scope_descriptions = [
{
"scope": "inherit",
"description": scopes.scope_definitions['inherit'][
'description'
],
"filter": "",
}
]
else:
scope_descriptions = scopes.describe_raw_scopes(
scopes_to_describe,
username=self.current_user.name,
)
# Render oauth 'Authorize application...' page
auth_state = await self.current_user.get_auth_state()
self.write(
await self.render_template(
"oauth.html",
auth_state=auth_state,
allowed_scopes=allowed_scopes,
scope_descriptions=scope_descriptions,
oauth_client=client,
)
)
# Errors that should be shown to the user on the provider website
except oauth2.FatalClientError as e:
raise web.HTTPError(e.status_code, e.description)
# Errors embedded in the redirect URI back to the client
except oauth2.OAuth2Error as e:
self.log.error("OAuth error: %s", e.description)
self.redirect(e.in_uri(e.redirect_uri))
@web.authenticated
def post(self):
uri, http_method, body, headers = self.extract_oauth_params()
referer = self.request.headers.get('Referer', 'no referer')
full_url = self.request.full_url()
# trim protocol, which cannot be trusted with multiple layers of proxies anyway
# Referer is set by browser, but full_url can be modified by proxy layers to appear as http
# when it is actually https
referer_proto, _, stripped_referer = referer.partition("://")
referer_proto = referer_proto.lower()
req_proto, _, stripped_full_url = full_url.partition("://")
req_proto = req_proto.lower()
if referer_proto != req_proto:
self.log.warning("Protocol mismatch: %s != %s", referer, full_url)
if req_proto == "https":
# insecure origin to secure target is not allowed
raise web.HTTPError(
403, "Not allowing authorization form submitted from insecure page"
)
if stripped_referer != stripped_full_url:
# OAuth post must be made to the URL it came from
self.log.error("Original OAuth POST from %s != %s", referer, full_url)
self.log.error(
"Stripped OAuth POST from %s != %s", stripped_referer, stripped_full_url
)
raise web.HTTPError(
403, "Authorization form must be sent from authorization page"
)
# The scopes the user actually authorized, i.e. checkboxes
# that were selected.
scopes = self.get_arguments('scopes')
if scopes == []:
# avoid triggering default scopes (provider selects default scopes when scopes is falsy)
# when an explicit empty list is authorized
scopes = ["identify"]
# credentials we need in the validator
credentials = self.add_credentials()
try:
headers, body, status = self.oauth_provider.create_authorization_response(
uri, http_method, body, headers, scopes, credentials
)
except oauth2.FatalClientError as e:
raise web.HTTPError(e.status_code, e.description)
else:
self.send_oauth_response(headers, body, status)
class OAuthTokenHandler(OAuthHandler, APIHandler):
def post(self):
uri, http_method, body, headers = self.extract_oauth_params()
credentials = {}
try:
headers, body, status = self.oauth_provider.create_token_response(
uri, http_method, body, headers, credentials
)
except oauth2.FatalClientError as e:
raise web.HTTPError(e.status_code, e.description)
else:
self.send_oauth_response(headers, body, status)
default_handlers = [
(r"/api/authorizations/cookie/([^/]+)(?:/([^/]+))?", CookieAPIHandler),
(r"/api/authorizations/token/([^/]+)", TokenAPIHandler),
(r"/api/authorizations/token", TokenAPIHandler),
(r"/api/oauth2/authorize", OAuthAuthorizeHandler),
(r"/api/oauth2/token", OAuthTokenHandler),
]