- tests
- docs
- ensure all group APIs are rejected when auth is in control
- use 'groups' field in return value of authenticate/refresh_user, instead of defining new method
- log group changes in sync_groups
- Added hook function stub to authenticator base class
- Added new config option `manage_groups` to base `Authenticator` class
- Call authenticator hook from `refresh_auth`-function in `Base` handler class
- Added example
Some non-api spawn and redirect checks still had `self or admin`,
when they should have checked directly for the appropriate permissions
This removes the long-deprecated redirect from `/user/other` -> `/user/self` _if_ the other server is not running.
The result is a more consistent behavior whether the requested server is running or not,
and whether the user has _access_ to the running server or not.
wee care about what the browser sees, so trust the outermost entry instead of the innermost
This is not secure _in general_, in that these values can be spoofed by malicious proxies,
but for CORS and cookie purposes, we only care about what the browser sees,
however many hops there may be.
A malicious proxy in the chain here isn't a concern because what matters is the immediate
hop from the _browser_, not the immediate hop from the _server_.
do not allow token-based access to pages
Tokens are only accepted via Authorization header, which doesn't make sense to pass to pages,
so disallow it explicitly to avoid surprises
some things raise standard TimeoutError, others may raise tornado gen.TimeoutError (gen.with_timeout)
For consistency, add AnyTimeoutError tuple to allow catching any timeout, no matter what kind
Where we were raising `TimeoutError`,
we should have been raising `asyncio.TimeoutError`.
The base TimeoutError is an OSError for ETIMEO, which is for system calls
404 is also used to identify that a particular resource
(like a kernel or terminal) is not present, maybe because
it is deleted. That comes from the notebook server, while
here we are responding from JupyterHub. Saying that the
user server they are trying to request the resource (kernel, etc)
from does not exist seems right.
Non-running user servers making requests is a fairly
common occurance - user servers get culled while their
browser tabs are left open. So we now have a background level
of 503s responses on the hub *all* the time, making it
very difficult to detect *real* 503s, which should ideally
be closely monitored and alerted on.
I *think* 404 is a more appropriate response, as the resource
(API) being requested is no longer present.
- merge oauth token fields into APITokens
- create oauth client 'jupyterhub' which owns current API tokens
- db upgrade is currently to drop both token tables, and force recreation on next start
